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Active ResearchAI Security and Governance

Threat Models for Tool-Using Agents

Publication date
Oct 16, 2026
Author
SkyNet AI Research
Status
Active Research

Abstract

An agent that can call tools inherits the attack surface of every tool it can reach. This paper catalogues threat classes specific to tool-using systems, including instruction injection through retrieved content, privilege escalation across tool boundaries, and exfiltration through legitimate channels.

Technical documentation

The inherited surface

When an agent can read email, query a database, and write to a ticket system, a compromised instruction can chain those capabilities. The risk is not the model's intent but the composition of permissions.

Threat classes

We describe four classes: injection through untrusted retrieved content, confused-deputy behavior where the agent acts with more authority than the requester, cross-boundary data movement, and action repetition under adversarial input.

Controls that matter

Least-privilege tool scopes, explicit approval for irreversible actions, content provenance on retrieved material, and an immutable execution log. None of these are model improvements; all are architecture.

Residual risk

Controls reduce but do not eliminate risk. Deployments should state which residual risks are accepted and why.

References

  1. [1]Greshake et al., Not What You've Signed Up For, 2023
  2. [2]OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, 2025